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United States Supreme Court Cases in the
Court of Justice of the European
Communities
By PETER HERZOG*
L Introduction
Throughout his long academic and legal career, Rudolf B. Schle-
singer, neighbor at nearby Cornell University, mentor in the intrica-
cies of continental civil procedures and friend, was interested in the
interrelationship of legal systems.! It is the purpose of this brief pa-
per dedicated to his memory to examine a few instances in which
there has been some interaction between U.S. and European law, or
more precisely, the law of the European Community (Community),
in a rather concrete context: the reaction of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (Court of Justice) to a number of cases
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.!
The Court of Justice, instituted by articles 164 to 188' of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty) and by the
analogous provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community
has, as its main function, as article 164 states, to insure that "in the
interpretation and application of the Treaty, the law (and not just the
* Crandall Melvin Professor of Law, Emeritus, Syracuse University.
1. For a late example, see Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Com-
parative Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (1995).
2. For a much more general discussion of the influence of American law in
Europe, see Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM.
J. Coh. L. 229 (1991). While a few lower federal court cases are mentioned below,
this study has, however, been limited essentially to U.S. Supreme Court cases in or-
der to stress the interaction of courts of comparable stature and significance.
3. These articles will be renumbered if and when the Amsterdam Treaty is rati-
fied to articles 220-245. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUOPEAN COMMUNITIES AND
CERTAIN RELATED ACmS, Oct. 2,1997,1997 OJ. (C 340) 1.
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Treaty itself) is observed."4 The Treaty is not, however, an ordinary
international agreement. Early in the history of the Community, the
Court of Justice recognized in the famous Van Gend en Loos case
that the Community "constitutes a new legal order in international
law, for whose benefits the States have limited their sovereign rights,
albeit within limited fields."' Regardless of the exact definition that
may be appropriate for the Community,6 it thus has at least some
quasi-federal characteristics. It is, therefore, not surprising that some
parallels are drawn between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court
of Justice
Unfortunately, the actual decisions of the Court of Justice offer
no direct clue as to whether they have been influenced by decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Until the accession of two common law ju-
risdictions to the Community in 1973, Ireland and the United King-
dom,8 the Court of Justice did not cite even its own cases. Thereafter
it did so, but its opinions still tend to be somewhat bland and general
and to cite, in addition to the Court of Justice's own case law, only
Community materials. However, the Court of Justice includes an in-
stitution not found in the United States, that of the Advocates Gen-
eral. The currently (until 2000) nine Advocates General rank in sal-
ary grade and similar perquisites of office with the fifteen judges of
4. The European Community [hereinafter EC] was originally created as the
European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] by the Treaty of Rome of March
25, 1957 [hereinafter E.C. Treaty or simply Treaty], at which time the European
Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter EAEC] was also created. An official Eng-
lish translation was annexed to the Treaty on January 22, 1972 when Denmark, Ire-
land and the United Kingdom joined the EEC and the EAEC. CONVENTION ON THE
ACCESSION OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, Jan. 22, 1972, O.J. (L 73) 1 (1972) [here-
inafter ACCESSION OF DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE UK]. The European Coal and
Steel Community [hereinafter the ECSC] was created earlier, by the Paris Treaty of
April 18, 1951. The only official version is in French. The Maastricht Treaty re-
named the European Economic Community simply the "European Community," but
it did not change the names of the EAEC or the ECSC. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) art. G(1) (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573
(1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
5. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.
5. Cf. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
6. The literature on the topic is quite large. See, e.g., Konrad Lenaerts, Consti-
tutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1990).
7. For a recent piece, see J. L. Sauron, Le trait d'Amsterdam, une Rforme
Inachevde? [The Treaty of Amsterdam, an Incomplete Reform?], 1998 RECUEIL
DALLOZ [CHRONIQUE] 69,70 (arguing that the similarities will increase after the rati-
fication of the Amsterdam Treaty).
8. See, ACCESSION OFDENMARK, IRELAND AND THE UK, supra note 3.
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the Court of Justice. It is their function, in the words of article 166 of
the Treaty to" [act] with complete impartiality and independence, to
make in open court reasoned submissions on cases brought before
the Court of Justice in order to assist the Court in the performance of
the task assigned to it in Article 164." They are not the lawyers for
the Community or Community Institutions when the Community is
involved in litigation before the Court of Justice. That role is per-
formed by members of the legal services of the respective Institutions
or by outside counsel. The Advocates General, on the other hand,
constitute a body of official amici curiae, who contrary to the usual
position of amici in American courts, have no axe to grind and are
there merely to enlighten the Court of Justice by giving it a view un-
tainted by the necessarily partisan approach of the parties' counsel.
Normally, one Advocate General appears in each case; occasionally,
two submissions are presented.
The submissions of the Advocates General, sometimes confus-
ingly referred to as "opinions" in the official reports of the Court of
Justice, where they are reprinted together with the decisions to which
they relate, are much more detailed than the Court's decisions them-
selves. They analyze all the aspects of a case and provide references
to factual sources, scholarly writings and such. The deliberations of
the Court of Justice are not public, and dissenting opinions are not
published. It is, however, generally assumed that in the frequent in-
stances in which the Court of Justice follows the recommendations in
an Advocate General submission, the submission is a fair indication
of the Court's thinking. It is therefore significant that, in a number of
cases, Advocates General submissions cited decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court (and, occasionally, of lower federal courts) and thus
have brought these cases formally to the attention of the Court of
Justice. The balance of this paper will, as noted above, be devoted to
an examination of some of these instances.
El. Case References
Article 2 of the Treaty9 provides, as a fundamental task for the
Community, the establishment of a "common market," an area in
which goods, persons, services and capital move freely. This provi-
sion is then put into effect by a variety of others, including in par-
ticular article 30 which prohibits quantitative restrictions and other
9. The Amsterdam Treaty would not change that number.
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restraints on trade in goods between the Member States. The two
provisions together thus have an effect, as to the powers of the Mem-
ber States, somewhat similar to the effect the commerce clause in ar-
ticle I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution has on the powers of the
states. The latter-and for the present purposes no extensive discus-
sion is needed-when not implemented by federal legislation, may
prohibit state action that burdens, unfairly taxes or discriminates
against interstate (and foreign) commerce."0 When it is implemented
by federal legislation, the commerce clause may prohibit or preempt
contrary or incompatible state action." It thus seemed relevant to in-
quire whether the long American experience with the question of the
lawfulness of state-imposed restraints on commerce is useful to the
Community.
In a relatively early case, the Court of Justice ruled that any
measure which, directly or indirectly, limited trade between the
Member States violated article 30 unless it was strictly necessary for
the protection of a recognized exception to that article, such as the
protection of public health. The Court of Justice subsequently dealt
with numerous instances in which Member States adopted some
measure regulating a branch of the economy that did not intend to
limit directly the movement of goods into that Member State but
which was likely to have some impact on trade between Member
States nevertheless. After initially taking a somewhat strict view of
such measures, the Court of Justice eventually clarified its position by
drawing a distinction between rules that directly concern the nature,
packaging, etc. of the goods themselves, which violate article 30 with-
out more, and other regulatory rules that concern the manner of do-
ing business and are normally permissible if they apply equally to lo-
cal and non-local activities or goods and are thus not discriminatory.1
Apparently in order to protect the local and regional press, for
10. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (prohibition on out-of-state garbage).
11. For a recent example, see Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
12. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837; see also Case
120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung f(Ir Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649 (the so-called "Cassis de Dijon" case). Article 30 will be article 28 under
the Amsterdam Treaty if and when the Amsterdam Treaty is ratified.
13. See Joined Cases, C-267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Bernard
Keck and Daniel Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097. Because this case was decided in
November 1993 and seemed to modify the Court of Justice's position, it has, with a
degree of hyperbole, been referred to as the "November Revolution." Article 30 will
be article 28 under the Amsterdam Treaty if and when it is ratified.
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which advertising by retail establishments is an important source of
revenue, French law prohibits television advertising by retail estab-
lishments. An additional aim of the measure may have been the pro-
tection of small local retail stores against supermarket-type distribu-
tion systems, deemed to be more likely to resort to television
advertising. One of the more aggressive French supermarket chains
sought to have the prohibition invalidated on the ground that it vio-
lated Community law. When the case" came before the Court of Jus-
tice, the Advocate General assigned to it, Mr. Jacobs, suggested that
advertising played a significant role in promoting the free flow of
trade and a Member State restriction on advertising might thus be
prohibited by article 30.' To support his position, he cited a U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"6 in which the Supreme Court stated
that commercial speech (in this case drug price advertising) enjoyed
protection under the First Amendment. The Advocate General
quoted this passage:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is indispensable.17
In essence, the Advocate General disagreed wvith the Court of
Justice's distinction between restrictions on trade, which concerned
the goods themselves and were generally violative of Community law
and rules that concerned methods of doing business, such as adver-
tising, which were not violative. The Advocate General argued that
restrictions on advertising could have a significant impact on trade,
especially in the case of the introduction of new products or attempts
to penetrate a new market. He felt, however, that the French rule in
question produced a de minimis impact on trade and therefore did
not object to its application. The Court of Justice did not accept the
Advocate General's reasoning; it referred back to its general case law
14. Case 412/93, Socirt6 d'importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicit6
SA, 1995 E.C.R. 1-179,3 C.M.L.R- 422 (1995).
15. Article 30 will be article 28 under the Amsterdam Treaty if and when it is
ratified.
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
17. Id., 425 U.S. at 765.
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on the distinction between rules concerning products themselves and
rules concerning selling practices. It was under this reasoning that
the Court of Justice found the French rule was valid. Thus, the refer-
ence to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy did not seem to persuade the Court of Justice of the im-
portance of completely free advertising for the untrammeled flow of
trade in a common market."8
Another instance involving a conflict between a rule of a Mem-
ber State and Community provisions on the free flow of goods in
which American decisions were cited was due to a problem that ex-
isted both in Europe and in the United States, namely the long time it
takes to obtain approval by the competent authorities for the mar-
keting of prescription drugs. Manufacturers of "generic" drugs in
both places tend to acquire patented drugs some time before the ex-
piration date of the patent in order to submit them to the approving
authority for permission to sell an identical generic drug.
The ability to file for sales approval in such a rapid fashion by
using the patent holder's drug allows the manufacturer of the generic
drug to sell it immediately after the patent expires. Dutch courts
ruled that a Dutch manufacturer of generic drugs violated Dutch law
by doing so. The issue whether prohibiting such a practice on the ba-
sis of national patent law was compatible with Treaty rules on the
free movement of goods came before the Court of Justice in Generics
BV v. Smith, Kline and French Laboratories, Ltd." The Advocate
General defended the Dutch position and, in support, referred to the
initial American rule, which prohibited the practice." He noted that
in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,1 the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
proved a similar patent violation only after a change in the patent
laws which lengthened patent protection for drugs but permitted the
use of patented drugs for certain purposes. The Court of Justice
18. Note that in a more egregious case, the Court of Justice ruled that a ban on
advertising by flyers distributed across the Belgian-Luxembourg border violated ar-
ticle 30. In that case there was an obvious, direct impact on trade between Member
States. See Case C-362/88, GB-INNO-BM v. Confrd~ration du Commerce Luxem-
bourgeois, 1990 E.C.R. 1-667, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 346 (1991).
19. Case C-316/95, Generics BV v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd.,
1997 E.C.R. 1-3429, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1,029 (1997).
20. The Advocate General mentioned Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceu-
tical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990). Another issue in the
case was whether the principle also applied to certain non-drug items requiring the
Federal Drug Administration's approval.
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agreed with the Advocated General's reasoning that the practice in-
terfered with the patentee's essential rights.
The two Court of Justice cases mentioned above appear to be
the only ones regarding Member State restrictions on the free flow of
goods in which American cases were cited. It is somewhat surprising
that, contrary to expectations, American cases dealing directly with
state restraints on the movement of goods do not seem to be cited
more frequently in litigation before the Court of Justice. The use of
U.S. case law has, on the other hand, been more frequent in the anti-
trust (or, in Community parlance, competition) area. Here, the rele-
vant rules, in particular articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, are quite
similar to U.S. law.' At times, American cases seem to be quoted
because the American experience provided a helpful clue as to the
solution for a very similar problem arising in the Community context.
Thus, Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Conmissionn involved allega-
tions concerning a conspiracy by distributors of Pioneer audio prod-
ucts to partition the Community market, which they denied. The
Advocate General cited Eastern States Lumber Dealers Association v.
United States24 for the statement that "conspiracies are seldom capa-
ble of proof by direct testimony" to support taking action neverthe-
less.
A result also consistent with the views of the U.S. Supreme
Court is Ministere Public v. Tournier.5 In that case, the French music
copyright society SACEM had reciprocal arrangements with the cor-
responding societies in other countries, by which it obtained the ex-
clusive right to grant performance licenses for works represented by
22. Thus, article 85 of the Treaty (article 81 after ratification of the Amsterdam
Treaty) prohibits "agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States .... Article 86, on the other hand, prohibits the abuse of a dominant posi-
tion, by way of excessive prices or other unfair trading conditions, limiting produc-
tion or technical developments to the detriment of consumers, discriminatory pricing,
tie-in sales, etc. These provisions may be compared with section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1, which prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade and sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C sections 13 and
14, which prohibit certain forms of price discrimination, tying arrangements and so
forth.
23. Joined Cases 100 to 103180, Musique Diffusion Franqaise v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 1825.
24. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. McBride, 234 U.S. 600, 612
(1914).
25. Case 359/87, Minist~re Public v. Tournier, 1989 E.C.R. 2521, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 815 (1990).
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the foreign societies. It did, of course, have the right to grant such li-
censes for the works of French composers, musicians performers and
so forth. It required discotheques and similar establishments that
wanted to play copyrighted music to enter into a blanket agreement
with it under which the licensee obtained permission to play any and
all works in SACEM's repertory, foreign or domestic, in return for a
license fee based on the discoth~que's gross revenues. As many dis-
coth~que owners played only a small portion of the total works so li-
censed to them, mainly dance music of American or British origin,
they objected to that practice as excessively expensive and some re-
fused to pay the royalties demanded.
When they were prosecuted for copyright violation, they argued
that the blanket licenses violated the Community rules on competi-
tion. The matter eventually wound up in the Court of Justice. On
the issue stated,' Advocate General Jacobs referred extensively to
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,2 which also involved blanket li-
censes. The Advocate General noted that in the U.S. Supreme
Court's view, blanket licenses did not involve a per se violation of the
antitrust laws, but had to be evaluated under a "rule of reason" ap-
proach," which balances anti-competitive features of the blanket li-
censes against their procompetitive advantages. The Advocate Gen-
eral also noted several lower federal court cases? which had weighed
the anti-competitive effects of blanket licenses against their practical
advantages, in particular the easy and inexpensive manner in which
blanket licenses could be administered, compared with a license
based on the actual titles played in each establishment. The Advocate
General therefore recommended that a similar approach should pre-
vail under Community law, but he felt that this weighing was a matter
for the national courts, not for the Court of Justice because the na-
tional courts were more familiar with the factual problems in the
concerned Member States. The Court of Justice agreed with the Ad-
vocate General, holding that the practice mentioned did not violate
Community competition rules unless it could be shown that granting
discotheques access only to a part of a copyright management soci-
26. The case involved a number of other issues, but no American cases were
cited and are not being discussed here.
27. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
28. The Advocate General mentioned Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc'y of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984) and Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
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ety's repertory would provide adequate protection to the authors and
composers' rights involved without causing undue practical complica-
tions.
American case law also seems to have made a certain impact on
the question to what extent local (in this case, Community) antitrust
law may be applied to non-local activities which have a local impact.
In the so-called "Wood Pulp" case, A. Ahlstrdinz Oy. v. Commission,3
a number of producers of wood pulp from non-Community countries,
including the United States, Canada, Austria and Finland were ac-
cused of concerted practices intended to lead to unduly high prices in
the Community. The parties objected that this amounted to the ex-
traterritorial application of Community competition rules. The
American parties also claimed that whatever common arrangements
they might have amongst themselves amounted to a lawful export
cartel under the American Webb-Pomerene Act and international
comity prevented the Community from subjecting them to conflicting
Community rules.
On the question whether Community law could be applied to
agreements or concerted practices concluded or entered into outside
the Community, Advocate General Darmon extensively discussed
American law, in fact entitling part of his submission, "The Principles
of United States Law."''3 The Advocate General referred to the old
American Banana3 case and especially to the leading case United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, in which Judge Learned Hand
formulated the so-called "effects doctrine." Under the effects doc-
trine, any state may impose liabilities for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders. The Advocate General then
surveyed a number of subsequent federal court of appeals cases. He
concluded from his extensive survey that the American case law was
ample and enlightening, but that no sufficiently clear approach
emerged from it so that one could directly apply the American rule in
the Community context. He nevertheless urged an approach that
could be viewed as consistent with the American approach as of the
time of Mr. Darmon's writing, namely that foreign activities can be
subjected to local competition rules if they have a sufficiently sub-
29. Joined Cases C-89, C-104, C-114, C-116, C-117 & C-125 to C-129185, Ah-
str6m Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5194.
30. See id at 5220 n.28. In the original French text of the submissions, the
heading reads, "Les enseignenments du droit amnricain."
31. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
32. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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stantial local impact.
This approach was followed in the Court of Justice's decision. In
essence, it held that though the various parties' agreements or con-
certed practices may have occurred abroad they effectuated them in
the Community through the prices charged there. The Court of Jus-
tice also dealt with the issue, raised by the American parties, that be-
cause their conduct was lawful under American law, comity prohib-
ited the application of contrary Community rules to their agreements.
The Court stated that even assuming there was such a principle, it
was inapplicable since American law may have authorized the par-
ties' conduct, but in no way commanded it so that they were not sub-
ject to any contradictory obligations.3 Interestingly, the U.S. Su-
preme Court made a quite similar statement shortly thereafter when
it held that a group of British reinsurance companies who carried on
an extensive reinsurance business in the United States were not ex-
empt from American antitrust law on the ground, raised by the rein-
surance companies, that their reinsurance business was subject to de-
tailed regulation in the United Kingdom and they were in compliance
with those rules.'
Occasionally cases show, however, that the American approach
to antitrust may, at times, be different from that in the Community,
in spite of similar language in applicable provisions. Thus, in Tetra
Pak International SA v. Commission,35 Tetra Pak, a manufacturer of
33. The Wood Pulp case was an instance in which the Commission lost a battle
but won the war. After the Court of Justice decided that Community law could be
applied to the parties, the case was remanded to the Commission. When the case
came back before the Court of Justice on the merits, a number of the Commission's
findings were not upheld. Joined Cases C-89, C-104, C-114, C-116, C-117 & C-125 to
C-129/85, Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1307. However, the Court
of Justice's ruling on the extraterritorial application of the Community's antitrust
provisions is still the law.
34. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). There is no men-
tion of the Wood Pulp case in this opinion. It may be worth while to note that the
Court of First Instance of the European Communities, which now has particular ju-
risdiction to hear cases seeking a review of Commission decisions, occasionally refers
to U.S. Supreme Court decisions as well. See, e.g., Joined Cases T-24, 25, 26 & 28/93,
Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 11-1201, 1207,
Common Mkt. Rep. 74 (1997) (mentioning the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine de-
veloped in E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), which held that
an attempt to influence governmental action, such as the adoption of legislation, is
not a violation of the antitrust laws). This brief article is generally limited to cases
from the Court of Justice since cases from the Court of First Instance are highly fact
specific and, therefore, do not permit any broader conclusions.
35. Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1.5951, Common
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cartons for regular and UHT milk and similar products and of the
equipment necessary to fill these, was accused by the Commission of
the European Communities? of various abuses, including predatory
pricing and was fined. The Court of First Instance of the European
Communities' affirmed the Commission's action, holding, inter alia,
that it was not necessary to show Tetra Pak had a reasonable likeli-
hood of ultimately recovering the money lost by its pricing strategy.
Tetra Pak appealed to the Court of Justice. The Advocate Gen-
eral dealt with Tetra Pak's contention that the Court of First Instance
erred on this point, for which proposition the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp._ was invoked. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court conceded
that a predatory intent was hard to prove, but felt that abnormally
low pricing by itself should not be deemed predatory, in the absence
of proof of a reasonably good chance of recovery, following the
elimination of the competitor targeted, of the amounts initially lost.
The very purpose of antitrust law was the achievement of low prices
through competition, and this would be discouraged by undue accusa-
tions of predatory pricing.
The Advocate General agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court that
predatory pricing was hard to prove, but for that very reason felt that
proof of a reasonable likelihood of recovery of money lost should not
be required. In instances where a firm in a dominant position priced
goods below marginal cost, it could have no intent but predation,
though a wrongful intent would have to be shown if such a company
priced its products simply below average costs. The Court of Justice
confirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance and thus agreed
with the Advocate General.
The matter seems to show that in antitrust law, in spite of many
basic similarities, there are differences in approach. In the United
States, low prices for the consumer are viewed as a basic purpose of
Mkt. Rep. 1 186 (1997).
36. The Commission is a body composed of independent personalities, a kind of
universal administrative agency which implements, inter alia, the EC's competition
rules. In addition, the Commission has the right to propose EC legislation and sue
Member States for Treaty violations.
37. Antitrust decisions by the Commission are reviewable by the Court of First
Instance on the law and the facts, with further review on questions of law to the
Court of Justice. See EC TREATY art. 168a (article 225 after the Amsterdam Treaty
is ratified).
38. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
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antitrust policy; in the Community, the emphasis seems rather to be
on the protection of competition per se, and thus also of competi-
tors .
Patent cases sometimes involve concerns somewhat related to
antitrust cases because they must balance the patent holder's rights
against the impact of those rights on competition. Here too, the Ad-
vocates General sometimes seek guidance from the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Bayer A. G, v. Sullhofer,' ° the question was whether a "no
challenge" clause included in an agreement settling a patent claim
violated Treaty rules on the free movement of goods (in particular
article 30) and competition. The Advocate General mentioned, in
this context, Lear v. Adkins,4 which held that such clauses were
against public policy. The Court of Justice agreed in part. It recog-
nized that such clauses might unduly restrict competition, but only if
the license involved was not free or the patented technology was not
outdated.
U.S. Supreme Court cases are present also in Community law
that is less "economic" in nature, in particular the field of equal rights
for men and women.42 Article 119 of the Treaty provides for the
elimination of discrimination in pay between men and women. In
spite of the somewhat vague wording of the provision, the Court of
Justice ruled in the second Defrenne case43 that the provision was di-
rectly applicable ("self-executing") and bound employers and em-
ployees in the Community. The principle was further implemented
by a Directive of the Council" of the European Communities."
39. Cf. A. Frederickson and J. Carr, Inside DGIV, EURO. COUNs., at 13, 19-20
(Nov. 8, 1997) (interviewing the head of the Commission's Directorate General IV(DGIV), which deals with competition matters).
40. Case 65186, Bayer v. Sullhofer, 1988 E.C.R. 5249, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
220 (1990).
41. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
42. Article 6 of the Treaty (article 12 after ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty)
prohibits discrimination on account of nationality within the scope of application of
the Treaty, but apart from the prohibition of discrimination between men and
women in pay, article 119 contains no additional rules against discrimination, based,
for example, on religion, age, etc. Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, however,
would authorize the Council of Ministers (see infra note 44) to adopt provisions pro-
hibiting discrimination based on ethnic origin, sex, religion, ideology, handicap, age
or sexual orientation.
43. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
44. The Council of Ministers is composed of one cabinet Minister from each
Member State. It is the chief law-making body in the EC, though it normally acts on
a proposal from the Commission. To some extent, it must cooperate with the Euro-
pean Parliament, which is composed of directly elected members. The main forms
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In 1990, the Court of Justice faced the question of the principle
of non-discrimination in pay in a rather special context in Barber v.
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group.* In that case, the em-
ployer had a rule according to which women who were dismissed as a
result of reductions in staff could obtain, in some instances, a retire-
ment pension immediately while men in such a situation could obtain
a pension only upon reaching normal retirement age. The Court of
Justice ruled that this violated the equal pay principle but decided
that the decision should not be retroactive; for good measure, the
Member States added a further non-retroactivity provision to the
1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union in Protocol Number 2.
The Barber decision raised two issues: (1) to what extent other
forms of inequality in employment based pensions were rendered
unlawful by the Court of Justice; and (2) precisely what the principle
of non-retroactivity meant in such contexts. These issues were raised
in a number of cases, in particular Ten Oever v. Stichlting Bedrijfspen-
sioensfonds7 and Coloroll Pension Trustees, Ltd. v. Russel,4 for which
Advocate General Van Gerven provided a single, comprehensive set
of submissions, though the cases involved somewhat different, but
globally similar, problems.
The pension schemes in all of the cases were provided by em-
ployers (with employee contributions) as a supplement to (and in
some instances as a partial replacement for) the standard governmen-
tal (social security) retirement benefits. The retirement schemes were
essentially of the "defined benefit" type, that is employees were
promised a retirement pension calculated generally on the basis of
last or average salary and length of service, and these benefits were
funded by contributions from employees and employers. Some of the
plans offered, as an option, the replacement of the pension by a lump
of Community legislation are: "regulations," which are immediately and directly ap-
plicable in all Member States (somewhat like federal statutes in the United States)
and "directives," which generally must be transposed into national law by the Mem-
ber States. See EC TREATY art. 189 (249 after ratification of the Amsterdam
Treaty). Since 1993, the official name of the Council of Ministers is "Council of the
European Union"; it is often referred to simply as the "Council."
45. Council Directive 75/117,1975 O.J. (L 45) 19.
46. Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Group, 1990
E.C.R. 1-1889, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 653 (1990).
47. Case C-109/91, Ten Oever v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioensfonds, 1993 E.C.R. I-
4879.
48. Case C-200/91, Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd. v. Russell, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4389,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 489 (1994).
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sum benefit or continuation of the pension to a surviving spouse in
return for a reduction in the benefit. In connection with the applica-
tion of the equal pay principle to certain aspects of these plans, some
of the parties argued that taking account of the longer average life
span of women, compared with that of men, was not discrimination
since it related to an objective difference between men and women.
The Advocate General, however, insisted that this was not a le-
gitimate distinction. He relied heavily on City of Los Angeles De-
partment of Water and Power v. Manhart9 and Arizona Governing
Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris. In particular, he quoted the statement in Manhart
that statistical differences in longevity were not material in group in-
surance plans since the grouping of insurance risks always results in
the better risks subsidizing the poorer ones. To defeat the argument
that disregarding sex-based differences in longevity would impair the
financial soundness of retirement plans, he referred to the experience
in the United States where that was not permissible, specifically by
citing Norris. Actuarial factors could, of course, be used in setting up
a pension plan, but the benefits paid to employees, and the plan con-
tributions to be made by them had to be identical.
The Court of Justice largely agreed with the position of the Ad-
vocate General. It stated that in "defined benefit" pension schemes,
the benefits paid to male and to female employees had to be identi-
cal. Furthermore, the contributions required of employees, which
were deductions from salary, had to be identical as well. It was not,
however, a violation of the equal pay principle for the employer to
make a proportionately greater contribution for the female members
of the plan than for male members in order to preserve the plan's ac-
tuarial soundness and thus to take the greater longevity of women
into account. Somewhat more surprisingly, the Court of Justice also
indicated that in instances in which an employee could, under the
plan, take the actuarial value of future benefits in cash in lieu of the
future benefits or convert part of the actuarial value into survivor
benefits (thus reducing the immediate pension), the use of sex-based
actuarial tables was not unlawful to calculate that actuarial value."
49. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
50. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensa-
tion v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). The Advocate General also mentioned Florida
v. Long, 487 U.S. 223 (1988).
51. Some of the litigation mentioned in the text started in the Court of Justice
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The Court of Justice thus agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court to the
extent that there were U.S. Supreme Court cases on point, but it did
not extend the reasoning into areas not covered by U.S. case law.
Not surprisingly, American law, in particular the case law of the
U.S. Supreme Court, has impacted the area of affirmative action,
usually referred to as "positive action" in the Community. In areas
other than pay (including, as noted above, pay related benefits),
equal treatment of men and women in the Community is governed by
Directive 761207/EEC. "n Article 1 of the Directive requires Member
States to put the principle of equal treatment of men and women at
the work place into effect in all employment-related areas. Article
2(4) authorizes measures to promote equal opportunity for men and
women, in particular, by removing existing inequalities which affect
women's opportunities in employment.
The German city-state of Bremen adopted legislation, according
to which if in a particular department women were underrepresented,
an automatic preference had to be given to women candidates for a
job in that department if her qualifications were equal to that of the
male candidate(s). A male candidate who was denied employment
under this rule brought suit against the city government, and the issue
of whether the German local law was compatible with the directive
came before the Court of Justice in Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bre-
men.' In long submissions, Advocate General Tesauro noted that
"affirmative action" had, in a sense, been born in the United States
and amounted to a turning from an individual to a group definition of
equality. He discussed in some detail the rejection of strict quotas in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakk? as well as the U.S.
Supreme Court's greater tolerance for goals of limited duration in the
case of clear evidence of past discrimination."5 Mr. Tesauro clearly
before the Council of the European Communities attempted to clarify the rules on
non-governmental pension schemes by Council Directive 86/378, 1986 OJ. (L 225)
40. As a result of the decisions in the cases mentioned, the directive was amended by
Council Directive 96/297, 1997 OJ. (L 46) 20, which in essence repeats the Court of
Justice holdings. The amended directive prohibits discrimination between men and
women in access or size of benefits and in contributions, but permits for "defined
benefit" schemes, unequal payments for the conversion of future benefits into a capi-
tal sum, or in the case of the surrender of part of a pension, in return for survivor
benefits.
52. Council Directive 76/207,1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
53. Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1995,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 208 (1996).
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The Advocate
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shared the dislike for strict quotas expressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bakke, noting that the aim should be equality at the starting
gate, not necessarily at the finish line. However, this would require
real social change in order to give women the same chances in em-
ployment as men.
The Court of Justice obviously shared the misgivings of its Ad-
vocate General about numerical goals in affirmative action. It ruled
that where such goals gave an absolute preference to women, without
any regard for personal, individualized factors, there was a violation
of the principle of equal treatment. Interestingly, the Commission
subsequently prepared a document on its interpretation of the ruling
in Kalanke 6 This document had a separate section (part 5A) on the
approach of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning affirmative action,
in which it reviewed many of the same cases the Advocate General
examined. Its conclusion was that the ruling in Kalanke did not pre-
vent a preference for women based on numerical goals, as long as
that preference did not prevent taking individual characteristics and
features of specific candidates into consideration. The Court of Jus-
tice subsequently confirmed that interpretation? 7
II. Conclusion
On the basis of the limited survey above, it would seem that the
impact of U.S. Supreme Court (and lower federal court) cases on
European Community law varies. The impact appears to have been
most pronounced in the area of competition law. Probably, however,
this is not due to any unreasonable fascination with the United States
but rather to the fact that American antitrust law preceded Commu-
nity competition law by many generations. Thus, it was natural to
look for guidance in the interpretation of Community competition
rules to a body that had a much longer experience with such rules.
But this deference to American examples has certainly not been
blind; as the Tetra Pak case' shows, Community and American anti-
trust rules pursue, to some extent, different objectives, which may be
due to different ways of looking at the economy and, beyond, at soci-
ety.
General also explained the strict scrutiny (as opposed to the rational basis) test men-
tioned in City of Richmond v. Crow, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
56. COM(96) 88 final.
57. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 :E.C.R. 1-81.
58. Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak Int'l v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951.
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The impact of American cases in the sex discrimination field
may involve reasons somewhat similar to those mentioned in connec-
tion with antitrust. Though this field is not as old as antitrust, the
American experience is, nevertheless, much longer than that of the
Community. While the detailed rules are not as similar as in the anti-
trust field, their general purpose obviously is. Again, it was reason-
able to profit from the American experience.
It is more puzzling why the American experience in the field of
federal-state relations in connection with the "commerce clause" had
little or no impact on Community interpretation of similar issues.
The reason is perhaps that, while there is a fundamental similarity be-
tween the purposes of a "common market" as mentioned in article 2
of the Treaty and the purposes of the commerce clause, the principle
of a "common market" in article 2 is elaborated on in a whole series
of Treaty provisions in further detail which would have been too
space consuming to completely mention here. The Court of Justice
thus often concentrated on quite narrow and precise issues, rather
than on broad problems of Member State-Community relations for
which American precedents might have been useful.
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